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CHATTEL MORTGAGES UPON FIXTURES

T

By Louis A. HELLERSTEIN of the Denver Bar

HE enormous growth throughout the United States of
installment purchases has brought to the fore many interesting as well as controversial questions. As controversial as any is the question of the rights of a holder of a
chattel mortgage upon fixtures, where real estate mortgagees
or subsequent purchasers are involved. Concerning this subject one can by a search of the authorities find support for
almost any theory urged. An utter lack of harmony exists
among the courts and their opinions are based upon conflicting
theories, grounds and reason.
The early authorities laid down the rule that whatever
was annexed or affixed to the realty became a part of it. Exceptions soon arose to meet "modern exigencies of trade and
commerce."
(Hurxthal v. Hurxthal, 45 W. Va. 584, 32 S.
E. 237.)
The question is further complicated by the fact
that courts have altered their views as to the circumstances and
the tests to be applied in determining when chattels retain their
character as such and when they become fixtures, so as to
become a part and parcel of the realty.
For illustration, in Colorado the original test laid down
by the courts to determine what is a "fixture" was the permanence of its attachment. This is illustrated in the case of
Vaughn v. Grigsby, 8 C. A. 373, 46 P. 624, which involved
a windmill erected upon realty. The decision was rendered
in 1896, and the test suggested was, whether the mill was "so
attached to the land as to be a part of it." The breaking away
from this test is shown by the opinion in the case of Cary
Hardware Co. v. McCarthy, 10 C. A. 200t 50 Pac. 744:
"Formerly the controlling question in deciding on which side of
the line of division an article belonged was: Is there a physical attachment to the realty of a nature indicating permanence? If there was, it
became a fixture. If not it was personal property and its disposition was
governed by the law applicable to such property. * * * Now it is not
absolutely necessary that in order to constitute a fixture, so as to take an
article from without the line of personal property, it should be perma299
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nently affixed to the freehold by physical attachment. This may or may
not be the case. * * * The controlling questions now, in determining
as to a large class of articles whether they partake of a real or personal
character, are the intention of the party to make a permanent accession
to the freehold, and theuse to which the article is to be applied."

And in the later case of Dawson v. Scruggs-VandervoortBarney Co., 268 Pac. 584, 84 C. 152, a more liberal rule is
stated, that:
"It is not now considered absolutely necessary that an article be
actually attached to the free hold in order to make it a part of it."

The Colorado court again recognized the difficulties involved in fixture cases when as stated in the case of Rare Metals
Co. v. Power Co., 73 Colo. 30, 213 P. 124, "No two cases are
exactly alike and hence no general rule can be applied to every
case.
Principally two situations arise which require determination as to the rights of a conditional vendor of chattels, such
as a chattel mortgagee, where fixtures are involved. The word
"fixture" is used here in its descriptive sense:
(1)
(2)

As againsta prior and existing realty mortgage.
As against a subsequent mortgagee or purchaser.

In the first instance what usually occurs is that the owner
of real estate purchases chattel property upon the installment
plan to be affixed or attached to his property, while there is
outstanding a trust deed or realty mortgage.
We are here discussing not such articles as doors or windows which integrate into the realty or improvement on the
land, but such chattels as furnaces, gas ranges, refrigerators
and the like, which between the original purchaser and lien
holder by the instrument used, are made chattels, since chattel
mortgages deal only with personalty, but as to the rights of a
real estate mortgagee, or purchaser of the personal property or
fixtures, as the facts may justify.
Let us now -discuss the priority involved between the
prior real estate mortgagee and the holder of a chattel mortgage which covers chattels annexed to the realty. That is to
say, while the recorded real estate mortgage existed, the owner
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of the fee title added chattels thereto and executed a chattel
mortgage to evidence the balance of the purchase price. The
general rule by a preponderance of authority is as follows:
"Where the removal of the fixtures will not materially injure the
premises, a seller thereof retaining a lien thereon may assert his rights as
againsta prior mortgagee of realty."

This general rule was followed in Colorado in the case
of Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Sylvester, 65 Colo. 569, 179 Pac.
154, in 1919. The facts in the Beatrice-Sylvester case were
briefly as follows:
Sylvester owned a farm upon which the Wallace State
Bank held a realty mortgage. Thereafter, Sylvester purchased
from Beatrice Creamery Co. two silos and at the time of the
purchase executed notes reserving title in the vendor until full
payment. The notes also recited that the annexation of the
silos to the land should not affect the rights of the vendor.
The notes, which were, in effect, conditional sales contracts,
were not of record nor acknowledged in accordance with the
chattel mortgage statutes.
The silos were 24 feet in diameter and 40 feet in height,
placed upon cement foundations. The weight of the silos
held them in place and they were fastened to the foundation
by cables and easily detachable. The value of the farm was
not affected by the addition of the silos and the silos were
removable without materialinjury to the land.
Under these facts the court sustained the lien of the vendor of the silos, even though its contract was a secret lien,
stressing the factor involved in the case, "That the silos were
removable without injury to the land." The reasoning of
the court to arrive at its decision was:
"One already holding a mortgage of the realty has no equitable
claim to chattels subsequently annexed to it. He has parted with nothing on the faith of such chattels. Therefore the title of a conditional
vendor of such chattels or a mortgagee of them, before or at the time they

were attached to the realty, is just as good against the mortgagee of the
realty as it is against the mortgagor."
(Jones on Chattel Mortgages,
5th Ed., Sec. 133a.)

Stating the decision in the Beatrice-Sylvester case, just
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discussed in another way, it would appear to be authority for
a converse situation, namely, that if the removal of the chattels
would materially injure the premises the rights of the real
estate mortgagee would be superior to that of the conditional
vendor.
The rule, under such circumstances and supported by the
weight of authority, seems to be as follows:
"Where the property sold has become so intimately connected with
or embodied in that which is subject to the mortgage that to reclaim it
would more or less disintegrate the property held by the mortgagee, the
reservation of title is ineffectual as to preserve the rights of the seller as
against the rights of the prior mortgagee of the realty." (13 A. L. R.,
note, page 473.)

In the case of Barbour v. Ewing, 16 Ala. App. 280, 77
So. 430 (1917), the Alabama courts held that a steam heating
system, consisting of a boiler, the necessary piping, and radiators placed in a building, lost their character as personalty and
became realty so that a lien to the conditional vendor was
ineffective.
A similar ruling was announced by the District of Columbia in 1933, in the case of Buss Mach. Works v. Watsontown, 2 Fed. Supp. 758, where it was held that a conditional
vendor of a sprinkling system installed in a building could not
reclaim them as against a prior mortgage.
The California courts have placed their decisions upon
another ground, as held in the case of Dauch v. Ginsburg
( 1931), 214 Cal. 540, 6 Pac. (2nd) 952, where it was stated
that plumbing fixtures and heating equipment installed under
a conditional sales contract in a hotel building, being attached
to the rough plumbing by means of slip joints, threaded unions
and flanges, was indispensable for use in the operation of the
hotel and that the rights of the prior mortgagee of the realty
were superior to those of the conditional vendor of the fixtures.
The court stated the plumbing and heating fixtures were permanent in characterand absolutely essential to the purpose for
which they were constructed.
In the case of Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik (1935), 180
At. 38, 118 Pa. Super. 405, the Pennsylvania court had before
it a case involving a furnace conditionally sold. The court in
this instance took into account the effect of removal of the
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furnace upon the heating plant in the dwelling. It refused to
recognize the lien of the conditional vendor of the furnace even
though its removal would not materially injure the building.
It laid down the following rule:
"The question is not whether a removal causes material injury to
the building, but to the operating plant, which includes all machinery
and equipment * * * in these modern days a dwelling house essentially consists of not only foundations, walls, roofs, etc., but lighting,
heating, plumbing, and sewage disposal systems also are regarded as
integral parts thereof. It is very generally known that very few houses
are now constructed without provisions for installing of a furnace in
the cellar. A heating plant is regarded as indispensable in this climate,
and is usually considered a component part of a building. Although
this furnace might be removed without serious injury to either the furnace or the house, its removal would have completely destroyed the
heating system."

Many courts have refused to follow the decisions of the
California or the Pennsylvania courts, namely, that if the
chattels were essential to the building or its operation they
became part of the real estate, and have adhered to the rule that
"material injury to the freehold" is the proper test to apply.
(Domestic Elec. Co. v. Mezzaluna (1932), 109 N. J. L. 574,
162 At. 722.)
This is illustrated by a Wyoming opinion where upon
exactly the same facts involved as in the Pennsylvania case
above cited, Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, the courts held
contrary to the foregoing case and sustained the rights of the
conditional vendor of a furnace applying the test that no dam-age would be done to the building. The case is that of Holland Furnace Co. v. Bird, 21 Pac. (2nd) 825 (Wyo.). The
facts and reasoning of the court will appear from the following
excerpt from the case:
"In the case at bar, the testimony on the part of both the plaintiff
and defendant is to the effect that the furnace can be removed from the
dwelling house without injury to the latter, the only things necessary
to be done to accomplish the severance being to unscrew pipe unions as
to the gas fuel feed, remove the smoke pipe from the heater by simply
slipping it off the casting and disconnect the furnace from the hot and
cold air pipes by slipping them apart, at the same time breaking the
asbestos paper covering at the location of the joints. In all of the Holland Furnace Company cases cited above, where there were contracts
with provisions similar to the contract at bar, and where the installation
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processes were similar to that pursued in this case, it was held that the
furnaces were removable as against a prior mortgagee or one occupying
a similar situation. For example, in Industrial Bank of Richmond v.
Holland Furnace Company, supra, the contract contained the clause,
'The furnace and piping in basement shall remain personal property at
all times and the title thereto shall remain in us until final payment
therefor, with the right in us to remove same in default of payment.'
There appeared as facts in that case, that the 'furnace was set up in the
basement of the residence but was not attached to the floor, being held
in place by its own weight. At each connection with a hot or cold air
pipe was a collar, two screws, and a wrapping of asbestos.'
"The plaintiff had no knowledge of the sales contract, and it was
not recorded. On January 12, 1929, the residence was sold under the
deed of trust, the plaintiff becoming the purchaser. The deed from the
trustees recited a consideration of $300.00. Subsequently defendant
asked permission of plaintiff to remove the furnace, which was refused.
The court, in the course of the opinion, disposing of the legal questions
involved, said:
"As the furnace was connected with the piping in such a manner
that it could be detached without damage to the building, the intention
of the parties when it was installed becomes the controlling factor in
whether it became a fixture. Bronson on Fixtures, par. 21 (d) ; Ewell
on Fixtures (2nd Ed.) 30, 31; Freeman v. Truax, 103 W. Va. 132,
136, 136 S. E. 697; Kanawha Nat. Bank v. (Blue Ridge) Coal Corporation, 107 W. Va. 397, 148 S. E. 383, and authorities cited on page
401. That intention as stated in the sales contract was that the furnace
'shall remain personal property' until paid for, with the right of removal
in case of default in payment. The weight of modern authority upholds
such a contract as against a prior secured creditor; particularly when he
advanced nothing on faith of the annexation and the chattel annexed
may be detached without impairing the creditor's original security.
Bronson, supra, par. 29 (a) ; 26 C. J., p. 684, par. 49; 11 R. C. L.
p. 1066, par. 9. The furnace was not paid for, so personal property it
remained with the legal title in the defendant."

In a case decided in 1933, Hammel v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 18 Pac. (2nd) 993, the California court held that gas
radiators installed in an apartment house, attached to the
pipes by threaded unions, could not be removed by a conditional vendee in face of a prior realty mortgage.
In the case of refrigeration the New Jersey courts, in
McLeod v. Satterthwait, 109 N. J. Eq. 414, 157 At. 670,
have distinguished between a complete installation in an apartment building, where a complete refrigeration system, including units, pipes and boxes was installed, and a case where
merely units and cabinets were installed, connected with pipes
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already in place. In the first case the court held the complete
installation to be a part of the real estate and in the second
situation the refrigeration was held to remain personal
property.
The rule in Massachusetts is that in respect to prior mortgages of realty, an agreement between the mortgagor and the
vendor of a chattel that the title to it shall remain in the seller,
after it is affixed to the real estate, is invalid, the reason being
that all fixtures are covered by the mortgage and the mortgage
contract cannot be changed by an agreement to which the
mortgagee is not a party. (Meagher v. Hayes, 152 Mass. 228
(25 N.E. 105).
Ordinarily, electric ranges, roll-about beds and similar
chattels have been held to retain their status as personal property (Dunn v. Assets Realization Co. (1932), 141 Ore. 298,
16 P. (2nd) 370.
The fact that chattels are worn out and are replaced does
not affect the rule followed in various jurisdictions; nor does
the fact that the mortgagee of realty has a clause covering after
acquired property of the mortgagor affect the rule in the
respective jurisdictions. (Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. 271, 91
Am. Dec. 209.)
The foregoing discussion relates to the controversies between mortgagees who have recorded liens upon real estate and
claimants who claim a lien upon chattels subsequently annexed or attached to realty. Now let us discuss the rights of
the parties where a recorded chattel mortgage is prior in time
to the real estate mortgage or the real property is purchased
by one without actual notice of the prior chattel mortgage of
record.
If a subsequent mortgagee or purchaser of the realty has
actual notice of the unpaid lien for fixtures, it follows that his
rights are subject to the rights of the conditional vendor. This
rule seems generally accepted. But whether the constructive
notice of the recording or filing statutes amounts to such notice
as to prevail, where a subsequent mortgagee or purchaser is
involved, is again a proposition on which courts have not
agreed. One line of authorities holds that constructive notice
is as potent notice as actual notice. Other authorities declare
that the vendor of chattels having consented that the property
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sold be affixed or attached to realty, cannot thereafter question
the same. The chattel having become realty, the record of a
lien upon the chattels as personal property became inoperative
and of no effect as to these third persons.
The majority rule, supported by logic and reason, would
appear to be that a purchaseror subsequent mortgagee of realty
is bound only to search the record title of the realty and the
record of any chattel lien would not be notice either construc-

tive or actual under such circumstances. (1 Jones Chattel
Mortgages, Sec. 134-6th Ed.)
A citation of the opinions in some of the pertinent cases
will illustrate the views of the various courts and their lack
of harmony.
In the case of Abramson v. N. W. Penn. Co. (1928),
156 Md. 186, 143 At. 795, the court considered the matter
of gas radiatorsin a dwelling and stated as follows:
(1) Does a conditional sales contract duly recorded under Article
21, par. 55, Code, afford to the purchaser of real property constructive
notice that the title to articles described in such sales contract, which at
the time it was made were chattels, but which at the time said real estate
was purchased were so incorporated therewith as to become an integral
part thereof, is reserved to the conditional vendor (a) when the character
of the chattels is such that the conditional vendor must have known that
they would in ordinary course be so used and converted; (b) where'they
were not of that character?
(2)
Were the radiators involved in this proceeding, in fact, at
the time appellant took title to the property in which they were located,
so annexed to the realty as to become a permanent and integral part
thereof?
(3) If the purchaser of the realty at the time of his purchase had
constructive notice of the conditional sales agreement, will he be permitted to assert title to the chattels against the conditional sales vendor,
whether the chattels were at that time integrated with the real estate
or whether they were not?
The proposition first stated is novel in this court, and, while the
question has not infrequently arisen in other jurisdictions, the decisions
in respect to it are too conflicting to establish any rule which can be said
to be generally accepted. Many courts of high standing have taken the
view that the recordation of a chattel mortgage or a conditional sales
contract, under a statute making such recordation constructive notice to
third persons, is sufficient to charge a bona fide purchaser. for value of
real estate to which chattels are annexed with notice of any lien or title
reserved in such mortgage or conditional sales contract to or against such
chattels. Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487,13 N. E. 826; Eaves v. Estes, 10
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Kan. 314, 15 Am. Rep. 345; Keeler v. Keeler, 31 N. J. Eq. 181; Ford
v. Cobb, 20N. Y. 344; Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 81;
Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook, 109 Va. 382, 63 S. E. 1070. Other
courts have taken the opposite view. Elliott v. Hudson, 18 Cal. App.
642, 124 P. 103, 108; Tibbets v. Home, 65 N. H. 242, 23 A. 145, 15
L. R. A. 56, 23 Am. St. Rep. 31; Brennan v. Whitaker, 15 Ohio St.
446; Phillips v. Newsome (Tex. Civ. App.), 179 S. W. 1123.
But such cases as Sword v. Low, supra, Eaves v. Estes, supra, limit the
application of the rule that recordation of the chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract is constructive notice to a purchaser or subsequent
mortgagee of realty to which the chattels described in the chattel mortgage or sales contract are annexed to cases where the chattels are of such
a character that they may be removed without damage to the freehold,
and where their essential utility does not require that they should be so
annexed to the freehold as to become a part thereof. So that they are
consistent with the theory that, where the nature of the chattels is such
that, if used for the purpose for which they were made, they would
naturally and necessarily be annexed to and become a part of some freehold, such recordation would not be constructive notice to the purchaser
of such real estate. That limitation is very precisely illustrated by the
case of Keeler v. Keeler, supra, where a chattel mortgage duly recorded
was held to afford constructive notice to a subsequent mortgagee of the
mortgagee's lien against such chattels, as spinning frames, etc., but no
notice at all to such mortgagee of a lien reserved against a steam boiler,
which had been so annexed to the realty as to become incorporated
therewith. The weakness of that position seems to be that it rests upon
no surer foundation than casual and subjective opinion as to the character of a given article, and affords little security either to the vendor of
the chattel or the purchaser of the realty, nor has it any logical basis in
reason or technical law.
On the other hand, Elliott v. Hudson, supra, Tibbets v. Home,
supra, Brennan v. Whitaker, supra, and Phillips v. Newsome, supra,
take the position that, if the chattel has with the knowledge of the
vendor been sold to be annexed to real estate and has been so annexed,
the purchaser of such real estate is not affected by the recordation of a
chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract, reserving to the conditional vendor, or the mortgagee of the chattel, any title or lien to or
against it, on the ground, that if in fact the property has become a part
of the freehold, it has ceased to be a chattel, and that the record of the
chattel mortgage or conditional sales agreement ceased to afford constructive notice of the creation of the lien or the reservation of title at the time
when the article ceased to be a chattel and became real property. And
that seems to us the sounder conclusion, and one more consistent with
the legislative policy of this state * * * The radiators were so far
as the record shows, ten separate heating appliances, having no more
connection with the freehold than an ordinary gas heater, portable
kitchen range or heating stove, which are certainly by the weight of
authority, held not to be fixtures. Ewell on Fixtures, p. 300. Such
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cases as Keeler v. Keeler, 31 N. J. Eq. 18 1, are not in point, for while
the pipes to which the court referred in that case were readily removable
without damage to the freehold, they constituted a necessary part of a
heating plant which itself was a part of a freehold * * *
Inasmuch as the chattels retained their character as personal property, and since it was admitted that they were described in the conditional
sales contract under which the appellee retained title to them and that
such contract was duly recorded, such recordation was sufficient to charge
appellant with notice of the fact that the vendor retained title to them.

A case of interest is that of Lasch v. Columbus Heating
and Ventilating Co. (1932), 163 S. E. 486, 174 Ga. 618,
which involved a furnace and its fixtures sold under a conditional sales contract duly recorded and the rights of a subsequent purchaser of the real estate without actual notice. The
furnace was installed in such a manner that it could be removed
without material injury to it or the realty.
The holding of the Court sustained the rights of the conditional vendor upon the ground that recording of his instrument was notice even though constructive, of his unpaid balance. The court's ruling is as follows:
"Our statute provides for the record of retention-title contracts, and
makes such record notice to the world * * * These statutes furnish
easy and available means by which an intending purchaser of real estate
can acquire notice of the existence of all retention-title contracts between
the owner and other parties; with this information prospective purchasers can determine whether chattels attached to real estate are held by the
owner thereof under retention-title contracts. The duty imposed upon
prospective purchasers of realty to make such investigation and inquiry
does not impose upon them any very onerous burden; certainly not
such a burden as would justify the destruction of the rights of sellers of
articles under retention-title contracts duly recorded. There are cases
holding to the contrary of whiat we rule, but we are of the opinion that
our ruling states the true law upon this subject."

In the case of North Shore Co. v. Broman (1933), 247
N. W. 505 (Minn.), the court sustained a recorded conditional sales contract upon boilers, and heating and plumbing
equipment installed in a building as against a subsequent mortgage of the realty, applying the sole test and placing its ruling
upon the ground that "the removal could be made without
substantial injury to the realty."
In some cases the courts have held that the chattels, although affixed to the realty, may retain their intrinsic character
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as personalty. An illustration of this is the case of Gardner v.
Buckly and Scott (1932), 280 Mass. 106, 181 N. E. 802,
which involved an oil burner used for heating a dwelling, set
upon and inside a boiler upon four lets, removable by unscrewing and an oil storage tank resting on a cement floor.
Under such circumstances the court found the chattels still
retained their character as such and upheld the claimants to
them.
Now as to the probable rule in Colorado, first as the
rights of the parties where a prior realty mortgage is involved
and a subsequent chattel mortgagee of fixtures. The proponents representing the holder of the chattel mortgage would no
doubt place great stress and urge the case of Beatrice Creamery
Co. v. Sylvester, 65 Colo. 569, as definitely adjudicating their
rights as superior to the real estate mortgage. It is true that
such a general rule was announced, but upon facts which
clearly disclosed that the silo was easily removable. Should
this same rule apply to such fixtures as a furnace, which might
be removable without material injury to the freehold? In my
opinion the better rule to follow would be the California rule,
which I have previously discussed, namely, that even though
the furnace is removable without material injury to the freehold, in this modern day it is an essential part of a house and
a house without a furnace or other heating equipment greatly
impairs its use as such.
What rule should govern in Colorado where the facts
disclose a valid recorded or filed chattel mortgage upon, for
lilustration, a furnace, and a subsequent realty mortgage or
purchaser? The weight of authority seems to be the better
reasoned rule, namely, that the subsequent mortgagee or purchaser is bound only by the recorded instruments relating to
realty and is not bound to search the chattel mortgage records
to see if chattels affixed to the realty have liens outstanding.
As to these controversial questions, until the Supreme
Court of our state announces a definite rule to follow, either
party may find ample support for his position and urge the
same, well fortified with decisions of high courts of many
states.

